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In this conceptual analysis contribution to the special issue on radical embodied cognition, 
we discuss how embodied cognition can exist with and without representations. We explore 
this concept through the lens of judgment and decision-making in sports (JDMS). Embodied 
cognition has featured in many investigations of human behavior, but no single approach 
has emerged. Indeed, the very definitions of the concepts “embodiment” and “cognition” 
lack consensus, and consequently the degree of “radicalism” is not universally defined, 
either. In this paper, we address JDMS not from a rigid theoretical perspective but from 
two embodied cognition approaches: one that assumes there is mediation between the 
athlete and the environment through mental representation, and another that assumes 
direct contact between the athlete and the environment and thus no need for mental 
representation. Importantly, our aim was not to arrive at a theoretical consensus or set up 
a competition between approaches but rather to provide a legitimate scientific discussion 
about how to explain empirical results in JDMS from contrasting perspectives within 
embodied cognition. For this, we first outline the definitions and constructs of embodied 
cognition in JDMS. Second, we detail the theory underlying the mental representation and 
direct contact approaches. Third, we comment on two published research papers on 
JDMS, one selected by each of us: (1) Correia et al. (2012) and (2) Pizzera (2012). Fourth, 
following the interpretation of the empirical findings of these papers, we present a discussion 
on the commonalities and divergences of these two perspectives and the consequences 
of using one or the other approach in the study of JDMS.
Keywords: embodied cognition, ecological dynamics, common coding, affordance, representation, 
self-organization
INTRODUCTION
Thinking about embodiment is as old as psychology itself. One of the founders of psychology, 
William James, stated early in his psychological writings that.
the world experienced comes at all times with our body as its center, center of vision, 
center of action, center of interest. Where the body is is “here”; when the body acts is 
“now”; what the body touches is “this”; all other things are “there” and “then” and “that.” 
(James, 1890, p. 154).
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We argue that when embodied choices in complex 
environments such as sports are considered, taking two recently 
discussed theoretical approaches into account can be  useful. 
One of them assumes that there is mediation between a person 
and the environment through mental representation, and the 
other assumes direct contact between a person and the 
environment and thus no need for mental representation. Both 
approaches will be used to contrast interpretations of embodied 
cognition in sports. This paper is submitted as part of the 
special issue on radical embodied cognition, and thus, we  first 
define and position these theoretical approaches in this discussion, 
then provide a detailed analysis of these divergent theoretical 
positions, and finally reexamine empirical evidence in two 
published articles from the perspective of the approach that 
was not followed in the original analysis.
Back in 1890, James was an early voice attempting to 
challenge what was then the accepted separation of the body 
and the mind, as put forth by Plato (428/427 to 348/347 
B.C.) and, more explicitly, by Descartes (1596–1650). Today, 
if one searches for the term “embodiment” or “embodied 
cognition,” more than 10,000 papers from the last 50  years 
and 100 of reviews in a dozen disciplines can be  retrieved 
from the Web of Science, a body of literature that is growing 
at a rate of at least three papers a day. This trend shows 
that the consideration of motor control, and thus the 
importance of the body and its movements, is now far from 
being the “Cinderella of psychology” (Rosenbaum, 2005) it 
once was.
Radical embodied cognition approaches assume that the 
functioning human body itself constitutes a cognitive process 
(Chemero, 2011; Jacob, 2016). According to Jacob (2016), there 
are at least two approaches. The “basal radical” approach 
principally denies the existence of representations and challenges 
computational approaches to cognition. We  refer to this as 
taking a direct contact approach. The “constructive radical” 
approach describes bodily processes with regard to their 
functionality and as a component of cognition. In some cases, 
a constructive radical approach accepts that there can be  a 
mediating role of mental representation (see Newen et  al., 
2018, for a range of positions). In sports, this discussion can 
be  traced back to the motor-action controversy (Beek and 
Meijer, 1988), in which a rather representational approach 
based on motor program theory (Schmidt, 1988) and an 
ecological approach to movements (Reed, 1988; Warren, 1988) 
that excludes representations from its explanations were pitted 
against each other.
It should be  noted that we, the authors, differ in regard 
to the radicality of our embodied cognition perspectives. 
We  agree that the mental representation approach could just 
as well be defined as a moderate embodied cognition perspective, 
contrasting with the more radical direct contact approach. 
Below, we define and elaborate of the concept of representations. 
From the moderate perspective, cognitive processes are based 
on or are at least moderated by sensorimotor processes 
(Barsalou, 2016; Zona et  al., 2018). The conceptual basis of 
this paper is that empirical findings indicating effects of 
sensorimotor processes on cognitive processes cannot 
be  ignored (Goldinger et  al., 2016) or explained as an 
“epiphenomenon” (Topolinski, 2010). Further, following the 
frequently cited review “Six views of embodied cognition” 
(Wilson, 2002), we  agree on Wilson’s major assumption of 
cognitive processes being situated, dynamic, and functional 
and serving actions or being expressed by actions. The mental 
representation and direct contact approaches differ in whether 
they see a strict separation of the environment and the person. 
In the following, we  argue that an embodied cognition 
perspective is needed to understand the dynamic interplay 
between people and the environment.
The present conceptual analysis focuses on the level of the 
individual (or group) performance domain (Rohrer, 2007) using 
mainly observed behavior of individual athletes in sports. Further, 
we  define the representational and direct contact embodied 
cognition perspectives (see next section) such that an organism 
is a direct contact agent to the extent that its behavior is an 
immediate (not mediated by mental representations) function of 
its ongoing interplay with the environment by perception-action 
coupling and “a representational decision maker to the extent 
that its behavior is an immediate function of various higher-level 
states downstream from its perceptual states” (Schulz, 2018, p. 14).
REPRESENTING THE WORLD AND  
THE BODY OR CONTACTING THE 
WORLD WITH THE BODY:  
CONTRASTS BETWEEN EMBODIED 
COGNITION PERSPECTIVES
Clarification of the Notions of 
Representation and Person-Environment 
System
In the present paper, we  refer to embodied cognition as: 
“Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent upon 
features of the physical body of an agent, that is, when aspects 
of the agent’s body beyond the brain play a significant causal 
or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing” (Wilson 
and Foglia, 2017, p.  1). When considering judgment and 
decision-making as embodied cognitive processes, we  refer to 
the concept of embodied choice: “The central statement of 
embodied choice is the existence of bidirectional influences 
between action and decisions. This implies that… the action 
dynamics and its constraints (e.g., current trajectory and 
kinematics) influence the decision-making process” (Lepora 
and Pezzulo, 2015, p.  1). We  extend this definition by adding 
that also previously learned movements can influence current 
decisions (Raab, 2012).
About the notion of representation, it is important to 
differentiate the representational and nonrepresentational 
perspectives. We  argue that representations within the 
research field of embodied cognition represent “neither states 
of the body per se nor states of the environment per se, but 
rather relations between body and goal” (Pacherie, 2018, 
p.  377). Naturally in science, there are multiple variations of 
such definitions as well as levels to describe them (Bickhard, 1998; 
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Haselager et  al., 2003). For the context of this paper on 
embodied cognition, we  do not use a narrow concept of 
representations, considering them amodal or encompassing 
abstract symbols as often discussed in computational-
representational theories of cognition (see Dempsey and Shani, 
2015 for a discussion). We  rather follow what is called an 
action-based approach: “An action-based approach to the 
problem of representation holds actions play a central role 
in shaping cognition” (Dempsey and Shani, 2015, p.  833). 
The content of such representations does facilitate prospective 
regulations of actions and can be  discussed for instance as 
common codes (Prinz, 2013), or events (Hommel, 2015), 
instantiated at a neuronal level as a group of mirror neurons 
(Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
The notion of person-environment system has implications 
for the concept of mental representation. Some approaches 
to psychology tend to be  based, tacitly and explicitly, in a 
number of dualisms of which mind-body is the most common, 
thus the need for an “embodied cognition” manifesto. For 
ecological psychology (e.g., Richardson et  al., 2008), these 
multiple dualisms are reflections of an overarching dualism: 
the view that organism (such as persons and other animals) 
and environment are logically distinct, separate systems 
(Järvilehto, 1998; Turvey and Shaw, 1999). The dualist view 
localizes cognitive processes in one’s mind and brain not in 
the surrounding. Consequently, a separation between person 
and environment originates explanations of cognitive activity 
centered at the organism. However, when organism is considered 
separate from environment, and the partial system (organism) 
represents the whole system (i.e., environment and organism: 
representations that give meaning to the stimuli from the 
environment and representations of how to control organism’s 
actions), there is a tendency to find explanation for behavior 
through variables (mental representations) that are beyond 
direct observation (Richardson et  al., 2008). Contrary to this 
tendency, for the ecological approach (Gibson, 1979), the 
person and environment are mutual (one implies the other) 
and reciprocal (one could not exist without the other), in 
that the existence and influence of organism on environment 
and the existence and influence of environment on organism 
are both equivalent and complementary (Gibson, 1979; 
Richardson et al., 2008). More than just mutual and reciprocal, 
however, organism and environment are a combined whole 
(Turvey, 2009), such that the organism-in-its-environment 
(i.e., the organism-environment system) should be  taken as 
the proper unit of analysis for studying behavior (Turvey 
and Shaw, 1999). Järvilehto (1998) suggests that, from this 
perspective behavior is a reorganization of the organism-
environment system, not an interaction of organism and 
environment; and cognitive processes are different aspects of 
the organization and dynamics of the organism-environment 
system, not local processes of the organism. This is why 
from an ecological approach, there is no need for a part of 
the system (the organism) to represent the other part, or to 
represent parts of itself (the body), or representing the 
interactions between both parts (for example, see Vicente 
and Wang, 1998, or Turvey and Shaw, 1979, for memory 
without mental representations; see Turvey and Carello, 2012, 
for intelligence without mental representations).
A Moderate Embodied Choice  
Perspective: Embodied Cognition With 
Mental Representation
In a recent review of different embodiment theories (Gentsch 
et  al., 2016), one representational approach identified was the 
common coding principle (Prinz, 2013), a prototypical account 
of embodied cognition with mental representations (see Gentsch 
et  al., 2016 for other representational accounts). It deviates 
from traditional representational accounts who argue for amodal 
and independent representations of cognition, action, and 
perception (Block and Fodor, 1972, for an overview, see Newen 
et  al., 2018). Instead, perception and action are linked by a 
“common code,” meaning that perceptions can be  transformed 
in the mind directly into actions and actions can influence 
perceptions (Prinz, 2013). The common coding principle is 
based on James’s hypothesis about the anticipation of action 
goals: That is, anticipated consequences (those to be  perceived 
in the future) guide people’s actions (see Mechsner et al., 2001, 
for an empirical demonstration).
In contrast to common coding, other radical embodied 
cognition perspectives are anti-representational (Wilson, 2002;  
Chemero, 2011), but this rejection of representations when 
explaining decision-making has recently been criticized (e.g., 
Schulz, 2018). Consequently, other theories have been developed 
that integrate embodied cognition with a representational 
account of decision-making (e.g., Schulz, 2018). However, in 
a recent discussion, representational accounts of decision-
making have been associated with costs of representations 
when deciding. If representations are costly arguments presented 
in detail in Schulz (2018) doubted that evolution has favored 
representations for decision-making. The typical argument that 
representational decision-making is costly is as follows (e.g., 
Schulz, 2018): Representational decision-making is costly, slow, 
and needs attention when humans decide. Given that 
nonrepresentational (i.e., direct contact) decision-making avoids 
such costs, it has been proposed that evolution favors it. 
Schulz (2018) refuted this argument by showing that 
representational decision-making can also be  fast and frugal 
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011), allowing for adaptive 
behavior as well as neural efficiency and thus evolution favors 
both representation and nonrepresentational decision-making. 
One reason why representational decision making can 
be  beneficial is that it allows for more flexibility in choices 
(Schulz, 2018). A second argument is that fast and frugal 
heuristics are quick and accurate (Gigerenzer et  al., 1999). 
In short, “the fact that decision rules need to be  stored does 
not affect the ease with which organisms can adjust to changed 
environments, and it does allow for faster and more frugal 
decision-making” (Schulz, 2018, p. 183). Thus, representational 
decision-making is not as slow as often assumed (see below, 
with the simple heuristic approach, how decisions can be  fast 
and frugal). Finally, Schulz (2018) showed that much decision 
making is representational to allow for adaptive behavior in 
the many domains in which choices take place.
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Common coding and direct contact alternatives can 
be  compared by looking at the types of tasks in which 
representations might be  needed. Representational decision-
making might be  more useful for decisions that are deliberate 
and protracted (e.g., an athlete’s decision to retire, made over 
the course of a month) than for short-term decisions (e.g., a 
playmaker’s allocation decision made in a split-second during 
control of the ball). This distinction is based on the work of 
Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz (2007). They separated offline effects 
from online effects in embodied cognition. Offline effects refer 
to the self-stored experiences of movements that influence a 
person’s own current decisions in a task even when the person 
is not moving. Online effects refer to the influence of current 
information from one’s moving body on one’s judgment. For 
example, a soccer coach observing the players on the pitch 
uses only her offline experienced movements to judge whether 
a pass or a shot is a good decision, but a player on the field 
additionally also uses his current (online) movement to decide 
to pass or shoot. Coaches’ and players’ behavior in principle 
can be explained by both representational and nonrepresentational 
decision-making. As argued above representational and 
nonrepresentational decision-making processes seem to have 
been equally favored by evolution (Schulz, 2018) and can both 
be used adaptively, depending on one’s current behavioral needs 
(see Raab, 2017, for modeling such dynamic and 
probabilistic behavior).
Representational decision-making is often assumed to rely 
on mental representations that are determined by content-
specific models and perspectives (Gentsch et al., 2016). According 
to the common coding principle, perception and action share 
a “common code” and thus are represented together. On the 
neural level, this common code is reflected in a group of 
neurons, so called mirror neurons, that are active both when 
movements are observed and when movements are performed 
(Prinz, 2012; Barsalou, 2016). Formally, this can be  denoted 
as “higher-level state S in organism O has content C if S has 
the appropriate structure to allow O to detect the world’s being 
in state C” (Schulz, 2018, p.  16).
How can these mental representations be  used in decision-
making in sports? Raab (2012, 2017, in press) has tested the 
simple heuristic approach and extended it to judgment and 
decision making in sports (JDMS). The simple heuristic approach 
is based on indirect perception: People perceive cues in the 
environment that they choose to use according to the cues’ 
validity, that is, how often a particular piece of information 
(cue) was helpful in good choices before (see Gigerenzer, et al., 
1999, for formal descriptions, behavioral tests, and modeling 
approaches). Simple heuristics have three building blocks: a 
search rule, a stop rule, and a decision rule. Those building 
blocks are thus a demonstration of a representational approach 
to embodied cognition.
How does one apply simple heuristics to sport decisions? 
One approach has been formalized (see Raab and Johnson, 
2004) and illustrated with a basketball example: Comparing 
two (or more) options (e.g., allocating the ball to different 
team members) with multiple cues (e.g., distance to the basket, 
distance to the next defensive player), the decision maker 
(i.e., playmaker) should start with the cue with the highest 
validity, for example, pass to the teammate who is closer to 
the basket. If two teammates have the same cue value, that 
is, both players are perceived about equally distant from the 
basket, move to the next cue, such as the distance between 
the teammates and the closest opposing defense player, and 
continue until one cue has a positive cue value, for example, 
one teammate is less defended, and then play to that teammate. 
This logic has been applied to different sport situations (Raab, 
2012, in press). The problem of the costs of representational 
decision-making is partly solved in the simple heuristics approach 
because rules are fast and frugal but still mostly accurate (see 
Gigerenzer et al., 1999). The main argument for why heuristics 
are efficient cognitive processes has been empirically validated, 
for instance, in the less-is-more effect (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 
2009; for further evidence, see Schulz, 2018, p.  171). The less-
is-more effect indicates that the expected proportion of correct 
inferences is higher when less information is used to decide. 
A good example of the less-is-more effect is the recognition 
heuristic, which has also been applied to sports, for instance, 
predicting the winners of women’s and men’s tennis matches 
in the Wimbledon tournament (for an overview see Bennis 
and Pachur, 2006). Using the recognition heuristic, one would 
predict for each competing pair that the recognized player 
will win. Studies applying such a test of recognition to predict 
a competition’s outcome have so far usually compared the 
predicted against the actual outcomes of a game. They have 
shown that the recognition heuristic can describe betting 
behavior quite well (e.g., Serwe and Frings, 2006; Scheibehenne 
and Bröder, 2007). Furthermore, the accuracy of predictions 
based on recognition are equal to, or even better than, experts’ 
seedings (an equation to calculate rankings of all players using 
multiple and weighted parameters) by the tennis associations, 
which are based on much more complex algorithms and a 
greater amount of information (Scheibehenne and Bröder, 2007).
We now illustrate this point by discussing selected articles 
with embodied cognition in JDMS. The rationale for selecting 
prototypical empirical illustrations for the conceptual analysis 
is to prepare a comparison of the mental representation and 
direct contact perspectives of embodied cognition. If the 
bidirectionality between perception and action holds (common 
coding principle), then training that activates the motor system 
(blindfolded to avoid visual perceptual input) should result in 
better visual perception. Casile and Giese (2006) asked 
participants to learn awkward walking by setting the arm 
movements to a phase of 270° to the gait pattern which is 
very far of the normal gait behavior. After participants had 
learned this pattern, they were shown point-light displays of 
these movements and movements in which the degree of arm 
movement, and gait pattern was not 270° and were asked to 
identify movements (e.g., those that belonged to the class of 
270° phase) or to discriminate stimuli (e.g., two movements 
are the same or different). Interestingly, participants from the 
motor-learning condition were better at identifying and 
discriminating movements without any visual-learning input. 
Good motor learners were better than poor motor learners 
in the perceptual identification and discrimination tasks, 
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indicating that the quality of the learned movements influenced 
the perceptual judgments. We  argue that these findings 
demonstrate, from an embodied cognition perspective, how 
the motor learning without visual input can influence visual 
task performance.
The empirical benefits of motor training in the above study 
for perceptual judgments can be  interpreted from a common 
coding perspective as follows: A person seeing point-light 
displays of movements will predict the action effects of those 
movements. If the person has experience with those movements, 
the solely perception of movements will activate the 
corresponding action via the common coding. The additional 
activation of the motor experiences allows that person to 
perform well in the identification and discrimination tasks 
(for similar effects and explanations that refer to internal models 
from our laboratory, see Kennel et  al., 2014a,b; for other 
laboratories, see Tucker and Ellis, 1998; Calvo-Merino et al., 2006).
Is empirical evidence from Casile and Giese (2006) enough 
to say that the motor system affects the visual perception of 
movements and thus is the action-execution part of the decision-
making process? This question is presented because the learning 
experience in the Casile and Giese’s study is a typical offline 
effect of embodied cognition, as described above. The learning 
was prior to the perceptual tasks in which participants were 
not moving. Whether action execution is part of the decision-
making process, when online movement choices are conducted, 
was investigated by Aczel et  al. (2018) in arm movements 
toward two targets. The authors differentiated whether the 
movement to one of the targets was influenced by the ongoing 
movement toward the target or by the movement costs associated 
with changing the movement direction to select a different 
option. In two experiments, they showed that energetic movement 
costs influenced target choice but not the ongoing direction 
of the movement. The authors interpreted these experimental 
results as evidence against an embodied-choice hypothesis. 
We  assume that the experimental evidence does not violate 
embodied-choice principles as the energetic costs of changing 
movement trajectories between two arm movements are small. 
However, in other real situations, such as climbing, for example, 
action execution would most likely be  part of the decision-
making process because the climber’s survival could depend 
on it. Another line of evidence is based on neuroscience showing 
that the motor system is active during deciding between two 
targets (Cos et al., 2011). In sum, we argued that a representational 
approach of embodied cognition could be  used to interpret 
empirical findings of sport choices which we call an embodied 
choice perspective (Raab, 2012).
Ecological Dynamics of Decision-Making: 
Embodied Cognition With Direct Contact
As recently mentioned by Baggs and Chemero (2018), basal 
radical embodied cognitive science has two approaches: the 
ecological approach and the enactivist approach. Both approaches 
reject representations as a needed construct to explain 
cognition. However, the ecological approach starts from the 
organization of the environmental properties (action possibilities) 
to explain how they constrain behavior for individual actors. 
The enactivist approach tends to start from the individual, 
characterizing the individual’s exploratory, self-regulating 
behavior. Here, we  present a particular ecological framework 
that combines dynamical systems with Gibsonian ecological 
psychology: the ecological dynamics framework (Araújo et  al., 
2006, 2017). This approach stresses the primacy of individual-
environment relations in understanding cognitive processes. 
The link between a performer and his or her environment is 
the proposed starting point for understanding how performers 
move about, select routes, decide with whom to cooperate, 
and compete with adversaries in the actual competition 
environment (see Correia et  al., 2013, for a review of studies 
exemplifying how). In the representational view, the behavioral 
expression of those decisions is not at the heart of cognition 
because behavior is assumed to be  an implementation of a 
mental representation (see Adams, 1987 for a review).
For ecological dynamics, the regulation of behavior as an 
expression of a cognitive process (Gibson, 1979) should not 
be attributed to one part of the individual-environment system 
(i.e., the performer) but to this entire system. The selection 
of actions is embodied (i.e., it is shaped by the skills and 
characteristics of the body) and embedded (i.e., the performer-
environment system as the unit of explanation) in the 
performance context; that is, it is not based on inferences or 
other mental processes but on the interplay between whole-
body action and perception in a sport performance environment 
(Araújo et  al., 2017). Cognition is embodied (in a body) and 
embedded (in a context) so that detecting event information 
related to spatiotemporal characteristics specifies body forces 
and torques required in goal-directed action (Richardson et al., 
2008). This understanding of cognitive processes embraces the 
notion that major influences shaping individuals’ behavior are 
from the social and physical environment, as well as from 
their own action-perception skills (Araújo et  al., 2017).
In ecological dynamics, decision-making behavior is defined 
as transitions in a course of action, where cognitive processes 
are necessarily constrained by the evolving environment-
individual system (Araújo et  al., 2006; see below). The current 
state of this system is the result of a history of interactions 
that constrain the immediate action. In this way, current 
performance is shaped by memory and past experience (memory 
need not be  based on representations; Gibson, 1994; Reed, 
1996). An individual’s behavioral history as well as the skills 
and characteristics of the body channel action to a landscape 
of possibilities for behavior (affordances) offered by a particular 
environment. The field of affordances reflects the multiple 
possibilities for action that stand out as relevant for each 
individual in a particular situation because of his or her specific 
training, skills, and experience in related tasks (Rietveld et  al., 
2018). This means that the affordance landscape is constrained 
not only by the past (e.g., what is in memory) but also by 
the future, that is, by task goals, actions’ path dependency 
toward which the current action may be directed (not necessarily 
expectations or beliefs about the future). Behavior is an expression 
of skill, and at the same time, it is an expression of how the 
environment draws the individuals into it and solicits actions 
(Gibson, 1994; Reed, 1996).
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Measures of action, therefore, are a direct expression of 
cognition, contrasting with indirect expressions of behavior 
(and cognition) such as neurophysiological or verbal correlates 
(Araújo et  al., 2017). Neurophysiological and verbal correlates 
are not measures of cognition. They are nervous systems 
activations or reported words from which researches make 
inferences about cognitive processes. In turn, action is directly 
measurable, and if action is an expression of cognitive processes, 
then cognitive activities can be  directly measured. Skillful 
behavior is constrained by its past (path dependency) and its 
future (affordances), resulting in action being an ecologically 
flexible process (self-organized, emergent) to satisfy impinging 
constraints. When a system establishes a state due to the 
dynamic interactions among elements within the individual-
environment system (no element guiding the organization), 
the state is self-organized. Self-organization, as the term suggests, 
is not caused by external (e.g., coaches’ instructions) or internal 
(e.g., the mind) processes, but it is instead generated by 
interacting constraints within the individual-environment system 
(not directed by one single constraint). Actions (e.g., a lateral 
pass in soccer) that emerge (when a pass line suddenly appears) 
are different from the components that make up the system 
(e.g., the pitch, the ball, teammates, the legs of the performer) 
and cannot be predicted solely from the characteristics of those 
components. Consequently, many sorts of solutions to achieve 
a sport task goal can emerge given the many different ways 
its elements can interact under the same constraints. But instead 
of being a random process, or in the other extreme, a process 
that is internally programmed (determined) in advance, 
performers are perceptively attuned to affordances (by detecting 
information) that guide self-organizing action toward achieving 
a task goal (Davids and Araújo, 2010).
A major challenge is to understand the ability of individuals 
to perceive the surrounding layout of the competitive environment 
on the scale of their own body and action capabilities (Fajen 
et al., 2009). As performers move with respect to their surroundings, 
opportunities for action persist, emerge, and dissolve, even if 
the surrounding environment remains stable. Subtle changes of 
action can give rise to multiple and marked variations in 
opportunities for subsequent actions. The dynamic process implied 
in the perception of affordances provides the basis by which 
performers can control their behavior prospectively (Montagne, 
2005). However, cognition has traditionally been defined as the 
information processing that produces mental representations, 
even though there are no direct experimental observations of 
internal representations (i.e., representations cannot be  directly 
measured). Probably, the definition of cognition proposed by 
Stepp et al. (2011) best captures the embodied-embedded nature 
of the ecological dynamics perspective: “Cognition is the ongoing, 
active maintenance of a robust organism-environment system, 
achieved by closely coordinated perception and action” (p. 432). 
This understanding of cognition emphasizes its nature as an 
activity and its close relationship with perception and action. 
From this ecological perspective, characteristic cognitive capabilities 
accommodate the physical principles of dynamic systems (involving 
time evolution of observable quantities according to, for example, 
thermodynamic principles). Dynamical systems can offer tools 
(e.g., nonlinear physics and differential equations) to understand 
cognitive processes (see Araújo et  al., 2014, for an example of 
mathematical modeling of dynamic decision making in rugby 
using differential equations, and see Araújo et  al., 2019, for a 
review of studies in sport performance).
An important nuance is that affordances are only accessible 
to individuals with the necessary skills to act on them. This 
is why the characteristics of a performer, such as skill level, 
are of paramount importance. Rietveld et  al. (2018) defined 
“skilled intentionality” as the performer’s selective openness 
and responsiveness to a field of affordances. During the act 
of perceiving, the hands, legs, ears, or eyes of a performer 
can explore the available information in an environment, 
searching the surrounding, structured energy patterns. These 
structured energy patterns (i.e., information as it is ecologically 
defined), such as the light reflected from the soccer ball, are 
an environmental resource to be  exploited by active players 
(Reed, 1993). From this viewpoint, the process of perceptual 
attunement brings a readiness to affordances that without skill 
would not be  accessible, since it is skill that opens possibilities 
for action to an individual (Rietveld et  al., 2018). This implies 
that while affordances may exist in a performance or practice 
context, athletes’ skills facilitate their use of specific affordances 
(which invite actions, Withagen et  al., 2012). Importantly, 
successive actions are modulated by the individual exerting 
her or his agency by intentionally driving, the performer-
environment system dynamics at appropriate points to yield 
a trajectory (Withagen et al., 2017). In turn, these local dynamic 
interactions are coupled to larger scale dynamics, guiding the 
formation of the behavioral trajectory over longer time scales.
Reciprocally, the longer term dynamics could influence the 
short-term interactions (and thus highlight specific affordances), 
for example, by altering environmental conditions. Because a 
behavioral trajectory is assembled anew on each occasion, 
the action sequence is historically contingent and variable, 
allowing for the flexibility observed in ordinary action sequences. 
From this viewpoint, decision-making emerges as athletes 
search in a field of affordances to arrive at a stable, functional 
solution, emphasizing the performer-environment reciprocity 
(e.g., Araújo et  al., 2014).
CONTRASTING INTERPRETATIONS OF 
RESULTS OF EMBODIED COGNITION
In the following, we  evaluate two JDMS papers that were 
chosen to serve as prototypical examples of the perspectives 
on embodied cognition and their contrasting interpretations 
of effects discussed in this article. This allows us to illustrate 
our argument that the interpretation of empirical results can 
be  based on either concept. Each paper is an example of 
decision-making research in sports using one of the embodied 
cognition perspectives. Both papers demonstrate how research 
questions are formulated in the JDMS domain from an embodied 
perspective, provide phenomena that need explanation, and 
present two established paradigms that are used for research 
in JDMS. More specifically, the paper by Correia et  al. (2012) 
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was chosen because it tests a nonrepresentational hypothesis 
by means of assessing the dynamics and organization of action 
patterns for explaining choices. The paper by Pizzera (2012) 
was chosen as it provides a theoretical background of a 
representational embodied cognition approach using discrete 
choices and long-term motor experiences as the source of the 
judgmental process. Choosing these papers allows us to contrast 
the approaches and leads to a discussion of their commonalities 
and divergences in the “General Discussion and Conclusions.”
Comments on Correia et al. (2012)
The study by Correia et  al. (2012) showcases the dynamic 
systems approach within JDMS from a direct contact perspective 
using skilled young rugby players. In this study, the distance 
between two defenders in rugby influenced the movement 
parameters of the attacker and the probability of the outcome 
being to tackle (defender wins) or to try (attacker wins). The 
authors’ explanation was that movements are used flexibly and 
that movements adapt to changes in the environment such as 
the defenders’ behavior. The authors further argued that the 
defenders’ movement displacement trajectories express different 
“preferred relational states” in this attacker-defender system 
and that the attacker reacts to the defenders’ movements. 
Further, they argued that decision-making behaviors (e.g., the 
decision where and when to run) emerged as a function of 
changes in attackers’ spatial location during the performance.
From an embodied choice account of embodied cognition 
(Raab, 2017), the environmental constraints (distance of 
defenders) would be  used by the attacker to predict the action 
consequences of his own movements, which would be updated 
dynamically. A choice to move in one of the movement directions 
to pass a defender can be  modeled as an embodied choice 
as follows: The attacker uses predictions to prepare his movements. 
This means in terms of common coding, the anticipated response 
consequences that are based on his own sensorimotor 
representations. The hypothesis of the study would remain the 
same: Experts will be good at predicting the outcome of specific 
choices. The interpretation of the results, however, would change: 
The explanation of what movement will be  produced and how 
would be  based on the interaction of the sensorimotor and 
the cognitive system and would rely on a representation in a 
common code between perception and action.
From the simple heuristic perspective, the perception of 
the distance to defenders is defined as a valid cue for making 
the choice. The use of the cue changes dynamically depending 
on the speed and the movement trajectories of the attacker. 
If the cue “largest distance to the next defender” is the most 
valid cue, the athlete would choose the direction that would 
increase the distance to the next defender. Another interpretation 
is that the distance between an attacker and defenders is used 
by rugby players to predict players’ actions and internally model 
them (see Raab and Johnson, 2004 for an experiment and a 
computational model in basketball).
Comments on Pizzera (2012)
Pizzera (2012) studied regional gymnastic judges and the quality 
of their ratings of gymnastic performances. The task of these 
judges was to perceive and evaluate gymnasts’ performances 
according to predefined scoring rules. In her introduction, 
Pizzera highlighted that research has shown that perceptual 
judgments can be  constrained by judges’ position in respect 
to the gymnast and that the ability to perceive the information 
sources is another key aspect. This attunement to sources of 
information seems to be developed by exploring the task through 
different means (i.e., by performing it and by observing others 
perform it). Pizzera’s study aimed to clarify if judges who had 
performed the judged tasks and/or had experience observing 
others perform such tasks would achieve higher quality in 
judging gymnasts’ performance in such tasks than someone 
without this motor and observational experience. The assessment 
of such experience was based on a questionnaire that asked, 
for instance, how many years they had performed gymnastics, 
how many times they watched gymnastics per week, and if 
they could perform a specific task on the balance beam.
After judges learned how to use an online video test at 
their personal convenience, they rated gymnasts performing 
a specific balance beam task. The quality of the judgment was 
compared between judges who could perform the task themselves 
and those who could not. Pizzera found that adding general 
motor, visual, and judging experience did not improve the 
prediction of judgment quality. But judges benefited from their 
own motor experience on the specific balance beam task, 
increasing the quality of their judgment. Specifically, Pizzera 
found that judges who practiced the specific task they were 
asked to judge focused “on aspects that allowed them better 
perceptual sensitivity” (p.  606), and she suggested that studies 
focusing on eye-movement strategies may clarify the mechanism 
underlying this advantage. Pizzera concluded that this 
development of judgment expertise was achieved through 
structured and effortful adaptation produced by training.
From an ecological dynamics perspective, we  could not 
agree more with this explanation of the findings of this study. 
Indeed, to understand how a specific performance is achieved, 
one has to understand how the performer interacts with the 
task, and how the history of such interactions (experiences 
produced by training) perceptually attunes the performer to 
the relevant sources of task information that allow the 
performer to attain task goals. This is an explanation fully 
aligned with ecological dynamics, in that it is based on 
embeddedness and embodiment of the motor experience, in 
this case acting to perceive, attuning the judges to the relevant 
task information sources.
What is somewhat unclear, in the sense that it does not 
follow from the previous line of argumentation, is the second 
part of Pizzera’s discussion. She argued that the results from 
the study suggest that judges “use their personal experiences 
as information” (see abstract, p.  603) to improve the quality 
of their perceptual judgments about gymnasts’ performance 
in the studied task.
Why would a judge’s perceptual sensitivity to the 
environmental information presented by a gymnast performing 
a specific task need to be  combined with another, apparently 
unrelated, source of information, namely, personal experience 
from the past? A more parsimonious explanation would be  to 
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hypothesize that performance judgment is based on perceiving 
what is relevant from the environment directly, rather than 
perceiving this information and then, by means of some obscure 
process (that cannot be  directly measured), combining it with 
some consulted information from the past, with the goal of 
making the externally detected information more accurate—
exactly the same information that had been detected directly 
since the beginning. Then Pizzera continued to emphasize this 
less parsimonious explanation: “It would be  interesting to 
investigate whether judges with and without motor experience 
differ in how they internally represent the performed routine 
or memorize the skills” (p.  607).
There may be  some difficulties following through on this 
suggestion. The first is how to scientifically capture how judges 
internally represent the performed routine and how to detect 
differences in mental representations. Would it be  based on 
indirect measures of what mental representations might be, 
such as brain activation areas or verbalizations about such 
mental processes? (see Araújo et  al., 2017, for a discussion). 
Then one would need to justify how such mental representations 
are related to the task that the judges are performing (how 
the internal represents the external), how using such internal 
information benefits the perception of the gymnast’s performance, 
and finally how such internal and external sources of information 
are combined. Beyond the demonstration of such processes, 
there is another difficulty, which is to justify why such a detour 
(i.e., consulting internal information and then combining internal 
and external information) is necessary, if what seems to explain 
expertise is precisely the perceptual attunement to the relevant 
sources of (external) information (the gymnasts performing 
the task). This capacity to make high-quality perceptual judgments 
was achieved by the judges interacting with the environment 
over time, by means of a structured and effortful adaptation 
(attunement) to the task environment (motor and observational 
training), as Pizzera indicated. So, why search for mental 
representations if expertise in perceptual judgment is based 
on the discrimination of and sensitivity to environmental sources 
of information, developed through the particular bodily 
interactions with the performance environment? In short, a 
very straightforward explanation can be provided by an ecological 
dynamics approach to decision-making, namely, that judges 
with experience in perceiving and acting (i.e., performing) a 
task are perceptually attuned to the relevant constraints for 
performing that task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSIONS
It should now be  obvious that there are some commonalities 
and key divergences in the two embodied cognition approaches 
presented here. Starting with the theoretical commonalities, 
there is the body as the starting point for understanding 
cognition. For both approaches, the body shapes the knowledge 
of the world, where perception and action, that is, the means 
by which organisms contact the world, are intimately linked. 
The mental representation and direct contact perspectives of 
embodied cognition share the understanding that choices are 
not idealistically rational, and humans do not search for 
optimization or follow optimal rationality norms. Rational 
choices as advocated in some areas of psychology ignore bodily 
information for decision-making and thus are too mechanistic 
to be  useful for JDMS. We  envision a perspective here that 
highlights embodiment as a key to understanding JDMS, a 
perspective that defines success not in terms of optimality but 
in terms of adaptiveness in a current situation.
It is on how the body contributes to this ecological success 
that the two approaches diverge. For the embodied choice 
perspective, there is a place in the body (the brain) where 
perceptual representations match with action representations 
(i.e., common coding principle). But for the ecological dynamics 
(i.e., direct contact) perspective, there is no need for such 
representations because perception (and action) is direct (not 
mediated by representations): The patterns of ambient energy 
(i.e., information), such as light reflected from objects, directly 
inform what is there for organisms capable of detecting such 
energy patterns (e.g., humans do not have perceptual systems 
that detect infrared light). And therefore, action enables 
perception, and perception enables action.
Theoretically, both perspectives should be  able to explain 
how long-term experiences with specific movements help to 
advance peoples’ decision-making in sport and more specifically 
how referees, athletes, and coaches decide. Correia et al.’s (2012) 
study was originally presented from an ecological dynamics 
perspective. Here, we interpreted the results from an embodied 
choice perspective. Pizzera (2012) interpreted her findings from 
a common coding, representational perspective as part of a 
research program in her dissertation. The alternative 
interpretation argued from a nonrepresentational perspective. 
Both studies were used for the present conceptual analysis to 
simply illustrate the starting point for theorizing, rather than 
demonstrate a falsification approach that can be  accepted or 
rejected by an empirical test. The conclusion of this conceptual 
analysis is that mental representation and direct contact 
theoretical accounts of embodied cognition can coexist when 
explaining JDMS, to further refine the different theoretical 
views on embodied choice phenomena that are far from 
being understood.
From a methodological point of view, the two approaches 
converge in the search for representative experimental task 
designs (Brunswik, 1956), in the sense that the tasks represent 
the circumstances about which the findings are aimed to 
generalize. However, for the embodied choice perspective, the 
measurements are mainly discrete (e.g., the score of the judge’s 
quality in each trial), whereas for ecological dynamics, the 
measurements are mainly dynamic (e.g., the time series of 
each trial’s trajectory of an attacker when facing the defenders 
near the try line). This methodological difference also highlights 
a theoretical difference: that decisions are not all-or-nothing 
snapshots but continuous adjustments and transitions of a 
performer within his or her environment (Correia et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, current models in JDMS are often probabilistic 
and dynamic (e.g., see Raab and Johnson, 2004, for a dynamic 
representational approach in JDMS).
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Another line of divergence is the use of the representative 
design concept itself. From the perspective of the simple heuristic 
approach to embodied cognition, representative design (see 
Brunswik, 1956) refers to the tasks in an experiment needing 
to be  randomly selected (as participants are) from the general 
distribution and class of tasks in the environment. From the 
ecological dynamics perspective, representative design means 
that the actions and environmental constraints need to 
be  representative of the person-environment interactions in 
the real world (Pinder et  al., 2011). We  recommend providing 
a more detailed description of task selection for designing 
studies (see Johnson and Raab, 2003) or including environmental 
constraints (Chow et  al., 2011) such as time pressure within 
a task (Musculus et  al., 2018).
From a practical point of view, the authors agree that, for 
instance, for a coach, the implementation of these theoretical 
perspectives in practice may be  overall similar. Consider some 
practical implications of Correia et  al. (2012), p.  249: 
(1) “Participant behaviors are flexible and adapted in a goal-
directed manner to current task constraints” and (2) “simple 
practice task constraint manipulations, such as varying number 
of players involved, distances between players (e.g., defender-
defender initial conditions) and field dimensions, powerfully 
influence emergent decisions and actions of performers (attackers 
and defenders) in team games.” What does taking a mental 
representation or a direct contact perspective mean for selecting 
tasks in experiments and in training? Both perspectives would 
potentially agree that training needs to dynamically produce 
actions under constraints. This is in contrast to modular 
approaches to training, such as implicit perceptual training 
(Jackson and Farrow, 2005), cognitive training, such as in 
steps-of-decision-making training (Vickers, 2007), and repetitions 
of movement, such as out-of-water swimming movements. One 
potential distinction would be  that for the embodied choice 
approach, a relevant part of an exercise would be  to ask the 
performer to verbally generate options for the next action in 
a particular task, whereas for the ecological dynamics approach, 
the focus would be  on acting upon perceived affordances; that 
is, instead of highlighting the generation of action options, 
the performer should perceive task affordances and act upon 
them. For example, Seifert et  al. (2017) demonstrated that 
previewing a climbing route allowed climbers to become 
perceptually attuned to affordances. Once acted upon, they 
applied adjustments and revealed new information that, in 
turn, indicated further adjustments and so on toward goal 
achievement. Implementing these theoretical perspectives in 
experiments and practice sessions in sports could lead to a 
better understanding of individual differences in performance 
through the systematic use of multiple task variants and multiple 
tests (training measures), somewhat in line with recent 
methodological recommendations in the study of cognition 
(e.g., Boogert et  al., 2018).
How can JDMS be improved by applying embodied cognition 
with and without representation? We  illustrate this process 
with talent selection and development. Talent selection refers 
to sport systems in which youth are selected to become 
professional. In German soccer, this process involves about 
2 million boys, of whom only 600 are selected by the youth 
academies of soccer clubs, and only about 30 receive a contract 
with a professional club thereafter. Talent development refers 
to the training, education, competitive team assignment, and 
transfer policies affecting these young players over time until 
they become professionals (de Oliveira et  al., 2014).
From the mental representation perspective of JDMS, concrete 
applications need to refer to a specific framework. For instance, 
from the simple heuristics referred to above we  would select 
and train talent on learning and selecting between different 
heuristics (de Oliveira et  al., 2014). This talent strategy would 
not test cognitive and motor processes in isolation but rather 
would test sport- and context-specific heuristic use, often with 
separate measures of perception and attention (search and 
stop rules in heuristics), “what” decisions (which movement 
to perform), “how” decisions (how to perform a movement), 
and motor performance (decision and execution rules in 
heuristics). A talent selection camp in which decisions to 
select or not to select a talent would be  based on a list of 
heuristics. Knowing for each relevant heuristic how well talent 
is able to use it at a specific age makes it possible to use 
the heuristic for talent selection (Musculus et  al., 2018). For 
talent development, this simple heuristic perspective would 
not isolate cognitive and motor training but would integrate 
them (Jackson and Farrow, 2005).
The direct contact approach offers the principles for 
designing effective practice tasks and learning activities to 
develop talent and prepare them for the demands of competitive 
performance (Chow et  al., 2011). In ecological dynamics, 
the development of judgment and decision-making in talented 
athletes is, in part, the result of their responsiveness to the 
design, types, and modes of activities experienced during 
practice and play (Araújo et  al., 2004; Davids et  al., 2017). 
Such activities offer the athletes the possibility to learn how 
to be adaptive in detecting information and realizing affordances 
in different performance environments. Gaining expertise in 
this important part of athletic development involves selectivity 
since not all affordances are “for good” for all performers 
(supporting goal achievement) and some can lead to problems 
such as negative outcomes, injuries, or poor health (Araújo 
et  al., 2017). This connotation of affordances has some 
important implications for developing expertise and talent 
in sports. Competitive sports performance environments 
provide manifold action possibilities, which are uniquely 
relative to an individual (Gibson, 1979), requiring high levels 
of specific experience, development, skills, and intentionality 
to utilize such affordances (Rietveld et al., 2018). For example, 
opportunities for action in a performance environment that 
can be  perceived and realized by a professional athlete will 
differ from those used by a recreational athlete (Chow et  al., 
2011; Davids et  al., 2017). These ideas imply that task 
constraints, in an affordance landscape (Rietveld et al., 2018), 
can be  designed to invite specific actions from different 
athletes, depending on personal constraints, such as skill 
levels. Therefore, creativity in practice task design is warranted 
in presenting affordance landscapes in sports that are dependent 
on the athletes’ expertise levels.
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In conclusion, this conceptual analysis argues for a pluralistic 
account of the variety of processes implied in embodied 
cognition in sports. There is no single theory that can 
explain such complex processes and we  follow what has 
been studied in science in general, that it may depend on 
the starting point of your theoretical account what and how 
researchers think representations are important within 
embodied cognition (see Hesslow, 2002; Svensson and Ziemke, 
2005). The work presented may offer contexts and programs 
for further investigation, which can either contrast with or 
refine hypotheses from researchers accepting or rejecting 
mental representations. Despite our theoretical preferences, 
a hidden goal that brought us together was to focus 
the discussion on the explanation of the phenomena, 
highlighting that there are very different frameworks in 
place and that the discussion can go beyond computational 
power or sample size. The simple reason for this: 
JDMS is a fascinating domain to search for embodied 
cognition explanations.
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